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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaint iff/Respondent, : 
v. Case No. 20616 
DEREK ANDREASON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense 
of Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Section 404> ej: seq, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, in the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sevier 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge 
presiding. \JC J Q> *~ (& ~ 4&S 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was charged by Information with the offense 
of Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated, §76-6-404, et_ seq (1953 as amended). The case was 
tried to a jury on March 18, 19, and 20, 1985. Appellant was 
convicted of the offense of Theft, a third degree felony, an 
included offense to that charged in the Information. On April 
19, 1985, appellant was ordered to serve an indeterminate 
sentence of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison. 
That sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on proba-
tion. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order from this court reversing ( 
the judgment and conviction rendered against him, and remanding 
the case to the Third District Court for a new trial or in the 
alternative issue an order to enter a judgment acquitting the I 
appellant or entering a judgment against appellant for the 
lesser offense of Theft, a class B misdemeanor. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues raised in this case are: (1) Was appellant 
denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because the 
i 
same defense attorney represented both appellant and co-defendant 
as well?; (2) Did the prosecutor's improper closing argument 
deny the appellant a fair trial?; and (3) Was the evidence 
sufficient to sustain a conviction for a third degree felony? 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant and his father, Ray Andreason, were jointly i 
charged, as co-defendants, with theft of services. (R. 1) The 
service involved allegedly was electricity for appellant's 
outdoor lights and warehouse at his place of business. (Tr. ^ 
72-73) The State's theory on the involvement of appellant's 
father was that his seal appeared on the power meters that were 
bypassed. (Tr. 74-75) At trial, both were represented by the I 
same counsel (R. 8) and appellant was convicted of the lesser 
offense, a third degree felony (R. 68) while his co-defendant 
was found not guilty (R. 69). ^ 
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The evidence presented at trial showed that, on 
September 4, 1984, Larry Mills, an employee of Utah Power and 
Light, was investigating a complaint for an over billing at D 
and D Construction, appellant's business. (Tr. 78) Mr. Mills 
noticed a man using an electrical tool inside a warehouse on 
the property and the electrical meter to that building did not 
appear to have been properly installed. (Tr. 79) After remov-
ing the meter he found that it had been bypassed by hooking 
jumper cables to the wires going into the meter box. (Tr. 80) 
He then noticed that the cables went through a hole and into 
the building. (Tr. 81) After unhooking the cables he entered 
the building and found that the cables were hooked to a network 
of wires by means of a connector not customarily used for that 
purpose. (Tr. 84-85) Mr. Mills then looked through the ware-
house to determine what types of appliances were present and 
which ones appeared to have been recently used. (Tr. 86) 
During the course of the investigation Mr. Mills was told by 
appellant's father that the source of power for the warehouse 
was from extension cords running from the other building. (Tr. 
88) 
The following day Mr. Mills returned to conduct 
further investigation by opening the meters on the second or 
"dairy barn" building. (Tr. 90) He found one meter was properly 
installed and that the other involved a bypass which would allow 
electricity to be used without it being registered on the meter. 
(Tr. 90) Mills was told that the line on the meter that involved 
a bypass went to exterior, or area lights. (Tr. 93) Based on 
those observations and several assumptions, an employee of Utah Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Power and Light estimated that appellant had received $2,899.45 
worth of power that was not paid for. (Tr. 250) I 
At no time during the investigation did Mr. Mills 
conduct tests to determine if there was in fact power going to 
the warehouse from the improper hook ups. No tests were made { 
on any of the eguipment to determine if it was, in fact, oper-
able. (Tr. 136) Nor were any employees interviewed to determine 
the extent of the use of the equipment. i 
Employees of D. and D. Construction, appellant's 
company, testified that all of the power used in the warehouse 
came from either the "dairy barn" building or from a pole that - i 
was wired to that building because the outlets in the warehouse 
did not work. (Tr. 346-347, 355, 365, 372, 377, 383) Those em-
ployees also indicated that most of the equipment in the warehouse i 
was in need of repair and would not work. (Tr. 350, 387) 
With respect to the exterior lights, Reed Burrows, an 
employee of the power company, testified that the billing I 
practices of Utah Power and Light was to charge a set rate for 
such lights. (Tr. 304) A portion of an employee manual for 
Utah Power and Light indicated that an electrical hook up as I 
was used for these lights was proper under circumstances similar 
to those that existed in this case. (Tr. 536-537) 
The State attempted to show that appellant's father I 
was involved because a "stamp" that had been assigned to him 
had been used to place a seal on the wire securing meter. (Tr. 
152-154) Others who had subsequently been assigned the same 1^ 
stamp, testified that they had never done work on the meters 
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in question and had never used those stamps at the appellant's 
place of business. (Tr. 163, 165) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The respective arguments in this brief are as follows: 
The first point raises the issue of prosecutorial misconduct. 
The prosecutor, in his closing argument, argued that if appellant 
was not convicted others would be encouraged to commit thefts. 
These remarks called attention to matters which jurors would 
not be justified in considering. Further, appellant submits 
that these remarks probably influenced the jury's verdict. 
The second point raises the issue of the denial of 
appellant's right to effective assistance of counsel. The same 
defense attorney represented appellant and his co-defendant 
at trial. During his testimony, appellant's father made a 
statement placing the blame for the offense on appellant and 
exonerating himself. This was an actual conflict of interest 
resulting in a denial of appellant's right to counsel. 
The third point raises two related issues regarding 
the insufficiency of the evidence. The first is based on a 
failure to prove that the appellant obtained or exercised 
control over the property of Utah Power and Light. The second 
issue submits the State failed to prove the value of the services 
if the services were unlawfully obtained. Such failure would 
thus, as a matter of law, require imposition of judgment for a 
class B misdemeanor. 
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POINT I 
IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT THE PROSECUTOR IM- j 
PROPERLY CALLED THE JUROR'S ATTENTION TO 
MATTERS THEY WOULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED IN 
CONSIDERING WHICH PROBABLY INFLUENCED THEIR 
VERDICT. 
During his closing argument, the prosecutor told the < 
jury that they had an obligation to convict the defendants, 
otherwise others would be inclined to try to commit similar 
offenses. (Tr. 588-590) Defense counsel did object, but that i 
objection was overruled by the trial court.1 (Tr. 589) 
1. The argument and the objection involved the following: 4 
Now, if these two gentlemen were our only concern, we 
could probably let them go but they're not. Ladies and gentlemen, 
we have a concern for all of society, we have concerns if this 
goes on and that this is not an isolated incident. This type 
of conduct is pervasive and when we're — i 
Mr. Mower: I object. I think the prosecutor is 
trying to paint the picture that there are others who are not 
charged and who are not before the Court. 
The Court: Objection's overruled. This is argument, | 
Counsel. 
Mr. Brown: Perhaps the Defense would have you believe 
that nobody else is doing it but they are and everytime we have 
a jury trial, people are watching. People are watching to see 
how we administer justice and so, before you determine that I 
there is some reasonable doubt — and I'm not sure what it is 
— but before you determine that, you need to consider that 
we're not — we've heard a lot about these two Defendants but 
they are not the only ones here and they are not the only ones 
we need to be concerned about. We've got to be concerned about 
the law. i 
Now, we give the Defendants a lot of rights to insure 
that we never convict an innocent man but while we're insuring 
that, we need to be concerned about how many who aren't innocent 
are turned loose and how it affects them and us but also how it 
affects other, others who are going to base their decisions on i 
conduct and what they know about how our system works. (T. 588-
590) 
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In State v. Valdez, 30 Ut.2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973) , 
this court described the two pronged test to be applied to a 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on the improper argument 
of counsel: 
Counsel for both sides have considerable 
latitude in their arguments to the jury; 
they have a right to discuss fully from 
their standpoints the evidence and the in-
ferences and deductions arising therefrom. 
The test of whether the remarks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, did the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified 
in considering in determining their verdict, 
and were they, under the circumstances of 
the particular case, probably influenced by 
those remarks. 513 P.2d at 426. 
This test was followed in State v. Crevitson, 646 P.2d 
750 (Utah, 1982), State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (Ut. 1983) and 
State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Ut. 1985). In State v. Crevitson, 
supra, the prosecutor argued that if the defendant received 
money from a narcotics transaction even if he was not present 
where the transaction occured, he was still guilty. This court 
found that to be a legitimate response to an issue raised by 
defense counsel. The court also went on to find that a reference 
to the drug problem in the community in argument was simply a 
manner of calling the jury's attention to the serious nature of 
the offense. 
In State v. Johnson, supra, the court found the 
evidence was insufficient to establish the offense of theft by 
deception in that the element of a loss of an object of value 
has not been established. The court also found that the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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prosecutor had made several improper arguments. The court gave 
the following description of those improprieties: \ 
During closing argument, the prosecutor 
referred to William's apparent receipt of 
income from Hillhaven while receiving social 
security benefits as "double dipping." The 
prosecutor continued to state: "as far as I 
I am concerned white collar crimes like 
this is a cancer on society." Furthermore, 
the prosecutor referred to Patricia's and 
William's signing of Daniel's Hillhaven 
paychecks and depositing them in their per-
sonal bank accounts as "forging of sig- i 
natures." Moreover, the prosecutor made 
reference to Patricia's and William's filing 
for bankruptcy as an indication of dis-
honesty. The prosecutor stated that it 
"[d]escribes the type of person that we are 
dealing with." 663 P.2d at 51. i 
The court, stating that there "was no doubt that the prosecutor's 
remarks called to the juror's attention matters they would not 
be justified in considering", held that these remarks in and i 
of themselves would have required reversal had the court not 
already reversed on other grounds. (_id. at 51) 
In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Ut. 1983), the defense t 
was that the defendant had no motive to commit the arson with 
which he was charged. The prosecutor responded to that defense in 
closing argument. The court described that argument, stating: ^ 
In closing arguments, the prosecutor com-
mented on the lack-of-motive defense. "Whet-
her he's rational in his business dealings, 
you don't have to presume at all. And we 
know that criminals have all kinds of • 
irrational bahavior." Objection was made 
and sustained. The prosecutor continued, 
"You know people do things for odd reasons. 
Hinckley is a classic example." Objection 
was again made and sustained. 688 P.2d at 
485. * 
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The court found that the prosecutor's comments requesting a 
jury to consider matters outside of the evidence to be misconduct* 
The court did elaborate on the second prong of the test previously 
stated in Valdez, supra, 
"If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, 
the challenged conduct or remark will not 
be presumed prejudicial." State v. Seegerf 
4 Or.App. 336, 479 P.2d 240 (1971). Like-
wise, in a case with less compelling proof, 
this Court will more closely scrutinize the 
conduct. If the conclusion of the jurors 
is based on their weighing conflicting ev-
idence or evidence susceptible of differing 
interpretations, there is a greater likeli-
hood that they will be improperly influenced 
through remarks of counsel. Indeed, in 
such cases, the jurors may be searching for 
guidance in weighing and interpreting the 
evidence. They may be especially suscept-
ible to influence, and a small degree of 
influence may be sufficient to affect the 
verdict. Counsel is obligated in such cases 
to avoid, as far as possible, any reference 
to those matters the jury is not justified 
in considering. 688 P.2d at 486-487. 
Most recently, in State v. Smith, supra, the prosecu-
tor made the following argument: 
It is very difficult and we're fortunate 
here today, ladies and gentlemen, that [the 
victim] did report it because, if we're 
ever going to get hold of this, we're all 
going to have to do our job, including 
juries, and it is not an easy job but it's 
got to be done because so many are not 
reported because of the difficulties. So 
concern yourselves with that when you go in 
there. It's not Curtis Ray Smith that's on 
trial alone. It's our way of life, you and 
I, and how the public is going to percieve 
how the criminal law does its job. Do we go 
so far in determining that we don't punish 
an innocent man that we let too many guilty 
ones go or do we look at the cold hard facts 
and, even though the hammer of justice is 
about to fall, do our jobs, because, ladies 
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and gentlemen, if we don't, we know what the 
result is going to be, [Emphasis by the 
court] 700 P.2d at 112. 
The court found that this type of argument was "clearly improper" 
as it suggested that "the jury had some obligation beyond the 
determination of guilt or innocence of the defendant solely on 
the basis of evidence introduced at trial". 700 P.2d at 1112. 
The court held that the evidence of the defendant's guilt was 
substantial as it "..was not a case where the evidence presented 
a close question or offered several possible constructions of 
ambiguous evidence". 700 P.2d at 1113. 
In the instant case, the prosecutor argued that if the 
jurors did not convict the defendants they would be encouraging 
others to commit this sort of theft. This argument is indistin-
guishable from that made in State v. Smith, supra.2 Likewise, 
as in Johnson and Troy the prosecutor directed the jurors' 
attention to similar matters outside of the evidence. As for 
the second prong of the Valdez test, the evidence in this case 
was "close" and its ambiguities were subject to several inter-
pretations. Although there was testimony that the method of 
installing the power meters was improper (Tr. 79, 90), other 
evidence indicated that there was no power bypass on the meter 
for the warehouse. (Tr. 90) With respect to the hookup of the 
second meter, evidence suggested that the arrangement was 
authorized. (Tr. 536, 537) Due to these questions and conflicts 
2. The same attorney prosecuted this case and the Smith case. 
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that were present in the evidencef appellant submits that the 
jury was probably influenced by the improper remarks made by 
the prosecutor. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL'S JOINT REPRESEN-
TATION OF APPELLANT AND HIS CO-DEFENDANT, 
WITH WHOM HE HAD AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST, APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), the 
United States Supreme Court held that if an attorney represents 
multiple criminal defendants at trial who have conflicting 
interests, they are denied their right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as applied 
to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. In that case, a single attorney had been appointed 
to represent co-defendants in a robbery and rape case. The 
attorney made timely motions to withdraw from one of the cases 
and to have separate counsel appointed. He alleged that there 
was a conflict of interest between the two defendants, but did 
not elaborate on the nature of the conflict. All of his motions 
to withdraw were denied. The Court then held that when the 
right to counsel has been denied, prejudice will be presumed 
and the conviction reversed automatically. Citing the cases of 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1976) and Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court reasoned: 
...this Court has concluded that the assis-
tance of counsel is among those 'constitu-
tional rights so basic to a fair trial that 
their infraction can never be treated as 
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harmless error.1 [Citations omitted]. Ac-
cordingly, when a defendant is deprived of 
the presence and assistance of his attorney, 
either throughout the prosecution or during 
a critical stage in, at least, the prosecu-
tion of a capital offense, reversal is auto-
matic. [Citations omitted]. 
That an attorney representing multiple de- , 
fendants with conflicting interests is 
physically present at pretrial proceedings, 
during trial, and at sentencing does not 
warrant departure of conflicting interests 
is suspect because of what it tends to 
prevent the attorney from doing. 435 U.S. < 
at 489-490. 
Because of the problems inherent in determining when an attorney 
failed to act and assessing the effect on the jury verdict, the 
i 
Court held that prejudice need not be shown. In explaining 
this, the Court stated: 
...a rule requiring a defendant to show 
that a conflict of interests which he ( 
and his counsel tried to avoid by timely 
objections to the joint representation 
prejudiced him in some specific fashion 
would not be susceptibel of intelligent, * 
evenhanded application. In the normal case 
where a harmless-error rule is applied, the < 
error occurs at trial and its scope is 
readily identifiable. Accordingly, the re-
viewing court can undertake with some con-
fidence its relatively narrow task of as-
sessing the likelihood that the error mat-
erially affected the deliberations of the 4 
jury. [Citations omitted]. But in the 
case of joint representation of conflicting 
interests the evil it bears repeating 
is in what the advocate finds himself 
compelled to refrain from doing, not only 
at trial but also as to possible pretrial I 
plea negotiations and in the sentencing 
process. [Emphasis by the Court]. 435 
U.S. at 490-491. 
Subsequently, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 
i 
(1980), the Court ruled that the possibility of a conflict of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
interest is insufficient to require reversal of a case when an 
attorney jointly represents co-defendants. In that case the 
defendant accepted the services of an attorney whom his co-
defendant had retained. The two were tried separately, and nei-
ther counsel nor the Court raised the issue of a conflict of 
interest. The Court noted that unless defense counsel raised 
the issue of a conflict of interest the trial court need not 
make inquiries in a case involving joint representation unless 
the circumstances are such that the court knows or reasonably 
should know of the conflict. 
Although this is the constitutional standard, the 
Supreme Court has imposed a much higher standard on the federal 
courts. Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
deals with the defendant's right to counsel. Specifically, 
Rule 44(c) states: "'•'*"' 
(c) Joint representation. Whenever two or 
more defendants have been jointly charged 
pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been joined 
for trial pursuant to Rule 13
 f and are 
represented by the same retained or assigned 
counsel who are associated in the practice 
of law, the court shall promptly inquire 
with respect to such joint representation 
and shall personally advise each defendant 
of his right to the effective assistance of 
counsel, including separate representation. 
Unless it appears that there is good cause 
to believe no conflict of interest is likely 
to arise, the court shall take such measures 
as may be appropriate to protect each de-
fendant's right to counsel. 
The notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules indicates 
that the primary purpose for enacting this rule was to prevent 
post-conviction claims that joint representation had denied 
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criminal defendant's of their Sixth Amendment right the effective 
assistance of counsel.3 
It is clear that the Utah cases follow the Sixth 
Amendment rulings with respect to conflicts of interest when 
co-defendants are jointly represented by a single attorney or a 
single law firm. In State v. Tippetts, 584 P.2d 892 (Ut.f 
1978)f co-defendants in an aggravated robbery case were re-
presented by the same public defender at both trial and preli-
minary hearing. Prior to trial, the attorney represented to 
the court that there were no conflicts of interest and the 
defendants agreed to the joint representation. In upholding 
the conviction and judgment the court stated: 
[T]here is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the dual representation of Lopez and 
Tippetts during the preliminary hearing and 
at the trial in any way prejudiced the de-
fense of the appellant. 584 P.2d at 893. 
However, in State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697 (Ut., 1920), 
the same public defender office represented co-defendants charged 
with arson and burglary. One of the defendants testified 
against the appellant in exchange for a reduction in charges. The 
State argued that the conflict of interest issue was not raised 
in the trial court. In rejecting that argument the court found 
that the existence of such a conflict was clear in the record. 
This was because, in advising one client to testify against the 
second client, the attorney was not effectively assisting the 
3. The text of the Notes of the Advisory Committee are set out 
in full in the Addendum. 
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second client in that he was not identifying with that client's 
interest. The court went on to hold that because the defendant 
was denied the fundamental right of assistance of counsel, 
there was no need to show prejudice. 
In that case this court declined to adopt a rule re-
quiring separate counsel for co-defendants in every case in 
Utah. Although such a rule may not be necessary, this court 
should require trial courts to make an inquiry similar to that 
required by Rule 44(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
The reasons for the adaption of Rule 44(c) are described in the 
Notes of the Advisory Committee which are set out in the Addendum 
Essentially, the Advisory Committee felt that such a rule was 
necessary to protect the defendant's right to counsel, and also 
prevent post-conviction challenges to criminal judgments. A 
requirement for an inquiry by the trial court also gives judges 
enough latitude to either require separate counsel or allow a 
defendant to make an informed waiver of a potential conflict of 
interest. 
The issues that arise from the joint representation 
in this case are: (1) Did the trial court know or should it 
have known of a conflict requiring the appellant to be warned 
by the trial court? (2) Was there an actual conflict? 
With respect to the first issue, prior to trial there 
was little to indicate an actual conflict of interest. The 
defendants were jointly charged, (R. 1) and they were represented 
by the same counsel. (R. 8) The only thing that indicated an 
actual conflict was that different defenses may be applicable, 
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was the minute entry from the preliminary hearing indicating 
there were separate motions for dismissal for each of the 
co-defendants. (R. 17) 
During the trial itselff the judge should have become 
reasonably aware of the conflict. On cross examination, the co-
defendant, appellant's father was asked about his reaction to 
discovery of the bypass of the meter: 
Q: You'd never seen that cable sticking * 
out of there? 
A: No, sir, I had never seen that cable. 
I was really surprised when I seen that 
cable. 
,,,:.-.,,'•. i 
Q: I assume, Mr. Andreason, that you saw 
this concoction of materials? 
(Witness looks at exhibit). 
A: Yes, sir, that's where I saw the ends ' 
that had been cut off. I saw the ends that 
they had cut off sticking up and that's all 
I saw. 
Q: Is that customary electrical practice? 
A: Well, not necessarily, but it's — I've 
never thought of it before. 
Q: Has is ever been done before? 
A: Well, I never thought of it. I may ' 
have done it myself and I knew it. 
Q: So, after that and after he told you 
that and you expressed your surprise and 
then what, then he left? . 
A: That's right, sir. 
Q: Did you have a discussion with Derek 
about this? 
A: I called him and told him. I told him * 
I said what I thought and, of course, I'm 
not going to make mention of the language I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
used but he didn't know nothing about it. 
He was clear out in Vernal. 
Q: It's his building; isn't it? 
A: That's right. I don't want to be blamed 
for something I haven't done; that's right. 
(T. 481-488) 
Although appellant's father did not specifically blame 
appellant for the situation, the implication in the last answer 
is unmistakeable. At this point, the trial court was obligated 
to warn appellant of the problems of his counsel representing 
conflicting interests. Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra. Since this 
warning was not given the appellant was denied his right to 
counsel as guaranteed by the Utah State and Federal Constitu-
tions. Furthermore, since the co-defendant so clearly implicated 
him as the culprit in asserting his own innocence, there was an 
actual conflict of interest. The effect is the same as one 
defendant getting a reduction in charges in exchange for testi-
mony against a co-defendant, as was the case in State v. Smith, 
supra. Due to the fact that there was an actual conflict of 
interest prejudice need not be shown in order to obtain a new 
trial. Holloway v. Arkansas, supra. Consequently, appellant's 
conviction must be remanded to the district court and a new 
trial ordered. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO PROVE THAT APPELLANT 
OBTAINED OR EXERCISED CONTROL OVER ANOTHER'S 
PROPERTY. FURTHER, THE EVIDENCE FAILED AL-
SO TO PROVE THE VALUE OF SUCH PROPERTY OR 
SERVICES ALLEGEDLY OBTAINED. 
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The standard by which this court reviews a conviction 
to determine if the evidence is sufficient to sustain a convic-
tion has been described in a number of cases. Recently, in 
State v. Petreey 659 P.2d 443 (Ut. 1983), the court stated, 
In considering that question, we review the 
evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict of the jury. 
We reverse a jury conviction for insuffi-
cient evidence only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or in-
herently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted. 659 P.2d at 444. 
The court then went on to note the evidence must do 
more than raise a mere speculation as to the defendant's guilt: 
...we deem it desirable to emphasize that 
notwithstanding the presumptions in favor 
of the jury's decision this Court still has 
the right to review the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the verdict. The fabric 
of evidence against the defendant must cover 
the gap between the presumption of innocence 
and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of 
its duty to review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, the reviewing court will stretch 
the evidentiary fabric as far as it will 
go. But this does not mean that the court 
can take a speculative leap across a remain-
ing gap in order to sustain a verdict. The 
evidence, stretched to it utmost limits, 
must be sufficient to prove the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 659 P.2d 
at 444-445. 
In the instant case, the jury was instructed on the 
elements of theft as described in Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-
404 (1953 as amended) (R. 45-48) and further given a definition 
of theft of services as described in Utah Code Annotated, 
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§76-6-409 (1953 as amended) (R. 59). The elements instructions 
include the elements of theftf a second degree felony, (R. 45) 
a third degree felony, (R. 46) a class A misdemeanor, (R. 47) 
and a class B misdemeanor (R. 48). However, the court failed 
to give an instruction defining "value" to the jury.4 Two 
questions result with respect to the issue of the sufficiency 
of the evidence: First, did appellant obtain or exercise control 
over the property or services of Utah Power and Light. Secondly, 
if so, what was the value of such property or services? 
A 
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT APPELLANT 
OBTAINED OR EXERCISED CONTROL OVER THE 
PROPERTY OF UTAH POWER AND LIGHT. 
In the instant case, the evidence unquestionably 
showed an improper electrical meter hook up on the warehouse. 
(Tr. 79) However, there was no evidence introduced nor were 
any tests actually made, to determine if it was possible to use 
electricity in that building as a result of the hook up. 
Furthermore, employees of appellant's construction company tes-
tified that the electricity which was used in the warehouse 
building came from a pole or the office that was properly 
metered. (Tr. 346-347, 355, 365, 372, 377, 383) 
With respect to the bypass of the meter to the outdoor 
lights, a problem with the original wiring resulting in short 
4. It must be conceded that no such instruction was requested, 
nor was there an exception made to the failure to give that 
instruction (Tr. 549). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
circuits was described. Also, evidence was introduced to prove 
that the wiring on that meter could be proper, (Tr. 536-537) 
To prove a theft, the evidence must show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that appellant obtained or exercised control 
over the electricity in question, Utah Code Annotated, §76-6- < 
404 (1953 as amended). Specifically, the claim here was that 
of theft of services which requires a showing that the electricity 
was actually diverted for appellant's own benefit or the benefit .-* 
of another. Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-409(2) (1953 as amend-
ed). 
In People v. McLaughlin, 402 NYS2d 137 (N.Y. 1978), ( 
the court discussed the nature of the theft of electricity, 
stating: 
We have already indicated that the cases 
agree unanimously that electricity is a 
commodity which may be the subject of 
larceny, and that an asportation occurs 
when there is a tampering with the meter 
which has the effect of diverting the 
electricity to the gain of the subscriber 
at the expense of the supplier. From this 
there would seem to follow an imperative 
corollary. The moment the electricity is 
"asported" in the described manner, the 
subscriber is instantaneously in possession 
of stolen property, to wit, the wrongfully 
asported electricity. [Emphasis by the 
court] 402 NYS2d at 143. 
Although this deals with what is required to show that a 
defendant possessed stolen electricity, it is important that 
two requirements must be met: (1) that there was a tampering 
with the meter, and; (2) that electricity was, in fact, di-
verted. 
i 
i 
In the instant case, there is only speculation as to 
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the claim of an actual diversion. There was no evidence of any 
increase in billings nor any evidence to show that appellant's 
rate of useage was significantly lower than other similar 
businesses in that area. This "speculative leap" is prohibited 
by the standards set forth in State v. Petreey supra. Con-
sequently, appellant's conviction must be reversed and remanded 
with an order to the district court to enter a verdict of not 
guilty. f 
B 
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THE VALUE OF ANY 
ELECTRICAL SERVICES THAT MAY HAVE BEEN 
IMPROPERLY USED. 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-101(4) (1953 as amended) 
sets forth criteria for a jury to use in determining the value 
of lost or destroyed property. That statute provides: 
"Value" means: 
(a) The market value of property, if totally 
destroyed, at the time and place of the 
offense, or where cost of replacement 
exceeds the market value; or 
(b) Where the market value cannot be 
ascertained, the cost of repairing or 
replacing the property within a reasonable 
time following the offense. 
(c) If the property damaged has a value 
that cannot be ascertained by the criteria 
set forth in subsections (a) and (b) above, 
the property shall be deemed to have a 
value not to exceed $50. 
The State introduced evidence indicating the rate 
appellant would have paid. (Tr. 276-282) This rate was applied 
to machines that were observed in the warehouse. The amount of 
useage of the machines was an assumption based on an average 
established by the power company. (Tr. 284, 300) A police 
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officer testified that he had occasionally observed welding 
being performed in those premises and sounds of a power saw. 
(Tr. 240, 242) There was also some evidence such as metal 
filings and disturbed dust to indicate a recent useage. (Tr. 
86) 
A figure for the amount of power used by such machines 
was estimated by Utah Power and Light. (Tr. 276-282) However, 
Mr. Burrows, who made the estimate, stated that the information 
on the actual use of the machinery was unavailable. (Tr. 311) 
Consequently, the use figure was based on a number of assumptions 
on his part. (Tr. 289) The amount of use attributed to the 
outdoor lights was five hundred dollars worth of electricity. 
(Tr. 304) However, the evidence indicated that such lights 
were intended to be fed off the secondary line without being 
metered. (Tr. 187) These estimates, without more to substan-
tiate the use of electricity, also fall into the category of 
mere speculation. 
Consequently, the value of the service cannot be 
ascertained and must be deemed to be less than fifty dollars, 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-101(4)(c) (1953 as amended). The 
judgment and conviction must be reversed and the case remanded 
for entry of a judgment against the appellant for the offense 
of theft a class B misdemeanor. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant is entitled to a new trial due to the 
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prosecutorial misconduct and the denial of his right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. In the alternative, due to 
the insufficiency of the evidence, the case should be remanded 
to the district court with an order to either dismiss the charge 
or reduce the charge to a class B misdemeanor. 
Dated this day of November, 1985. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY V 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed/delivered to the 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84114, on this day of November, 1985. 
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ADDENDUM 
Constitution of the United States 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained 
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Amendment XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah 
Section 12. [Rights of accused persons]. In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause 
of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be- confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the country or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
i 
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(Addendum continued) 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
76-6-101. Definitions. For purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "property" means any form of real property or tangible 
personal property which is capable of being damaged or destroyed 
and includes a habitable structure. 
(2) "Habitable structure" means any building, vehicle, trailer, 
railway car, aircraft, or watercraft used for lodging or 
assembling persons or conducting business whether a person is 
actually present or not. 
(3) "Property" is that of another, if anyone other than the 
actor has possessory or proprietary interest in any portion 
thereof. 
(4) "Value" means: 
(a) The market value of the property, if totally destroyed, at 
the time and place of the offense, or where cost of replacement 
exceeds the market value; or 
(b) Where the market value cannot be ascertained, the cost of 
repairing or replacing the property within a reasonable time 
following the offense. 
(c) If the property damaged has a value that cannot be ascertained 
by the criteria set forth in subsections (a) and (b) above, the 
property shall be deemed to have a value not to exceed $50. 
76-6-401. Definitions. For the purposes of this 
part: (1) "Property" means anything of value, including real 
estate, tangible personal property, captured or domestic animals 
and birds, written instruments or other writings representing 
or embodying rights concerning real or personal property, 
labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value to 
the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such as 
telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and 
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific 
or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula 
or invention which the owner thereof intends to be available 
only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a 
transfer of possession or of some other legally recognized 
interest in property, whether to the obtainer or another; in 
relation to labor or services, to secure performance thereof; 
and in relation to a trade secret, to make any facsimile, 
replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period 
or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion 
of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would 
be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or 
other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
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(Addendum continued) 
(§76-6-401. Definitions continued) 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is 
not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known 
as common-law larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conver-
sion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement. 
76-6-404. Theft - elements. A person commits theft 
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property 
of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
76-6-409. Theft of services. (1) A person commits 
theft if he obtains services which he knows are available only 
for compensation by deception, threat, force, or any other 
means designed to avoid the due payment therefor. 
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over the 
disposition of services of another, to which he knows he is not 
entitled, he diverts such services to his own benefit or to the 
benefit of another who he knows is not entitled thereto. 
(3) As used in this section "services1 includes, but is not 
necessarily limited to, labor, professional service, public 
utility, and transportation services, restaurant, hotel, motel, 
tourist cabin, rooming house, and like accomodations, the 
supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or trailers for tem-
porary use, telephone or telegraph service, gas, electricity, 
water or steam, and the like, admission to entertainment, 
exhibitions, sporting events, or other events for which a charge 
is made. 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 44(c) 
Joint Representation. Whenever two or more defendants 
have been jointly charged pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been 
joined for trial pursuant to Rule 13, and are represented by 
the same retained or assigned counsel or by retained or assigned 
counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the court 
shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation 
and shall personally advise each defendant of his right to the 
effective assistance of counsel, including separate representa-
tion. Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no 
conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take 
such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's 
right to counsel. 
Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 44(c) establishes a procedure for avoiding the 
occurrence of events which might otherwise give rise to a 
plausible post-conviction calim that because of joint represen-
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(Addendum continued) 
(Rule 44(c) continued) 
tation the defendants in a criminal case were deprived of their 
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
Although "courts have differed with respect to the scope and 
nature of the affirmative duty of the trial judge to assure 
that criminal defendants are not deprived of their right to the 
effective assistance of counsel by joint representation of 
conflicting interests," Holloway v. Arkansas, 98 S.Ct. 1173 
(1978) (where the Court found it unnecessary to reach this 
issue), this amendment is generally consistent with the current 
state of the law in several circuits. As held in United States 
v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1976): 
When a potential conflict of interest 
arises, either where a court has assigned 
the same counsel to represent several 
defendants or where the same counsel has 
been retained by co-defendants in a criminal 
case, the proper course of action for the 
trial judge is to conduct a hearing to 
determine whether a conflict exists to the 
degree that a defendant may be prevented 
from receiving advice and assistance 
sufficient to afford him the quality of 
representation guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. The defendant should be fully 
advised by the trial court of the facts 
underlying the potential conflict and be 
given the opportunity to express his views. 
See also United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98 (8th 
Cir. 197) (duty on trial judge to make inquiry where joint 
representation by appointed or retained counsel, and "without 
such an inquiry a finding of knowing and intelligent waiver 
will seldom, if ever, be sustained by this Court"); Abraham v. 
United States, 549 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Mari, 526 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Truglio, 
493 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1974) (joint representation should cause 
trial judge "to inquire whether the defenses to be presented in 
any way conflict"); United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 4988 (2d 
Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 
203 (3d Cir. 1973) (noting there "is much to be said for the 
rule . . . which assumes prejudice and nonwaiver if there has 
been no on-the-record inquiry be the court as to the hazards to 
defendants from joint representation"); United States v. Alberti, 
470 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 
1 (1st Cir. 1972) (lack of sufficient inquiry shifts the burden 
of proof on the question of prejudice to the government); 
Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir, 1965) (where 
joint representation, court "has a duty to ascertain whether 
each defendant has an awareness of the potential risks of that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Addendum continued) 
(Rule 44(c) continued) 
course and neverthless has knowingly chosen it"). Some states 
have taken a like position; see, e.g.f State v. Olsen, Minn. 
1977, 258 N.W.2d 898. 
This procedure is also consistent with that recommended 
in the ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial ' 
Judge (Approved Draft, 1972) which provide in §3.4(b): 
Whenever two or more defendants who have 
been jointly charged, or whose cases have 
been consolidated, are represented by the 
same attorney, the trial judge should in- < 
quire into potential conflicts which may 
jeopardize the right of each defendant to 
the fidelity of his counsel. 
Avoiding a conflict-of-interest situation is in the 
first instance a responsibility of the attorney. If a lawyer < 
represents "multiple clients having potentially differing in-
terests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his 
judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts 
or continues the employment," and his is to "resolve all doubts 
against the propriety of the representation." Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 5-15. See also I 
ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function §3.5(b) (Approved 
Draft, 1971), concluding that the "potential for conflict of 
interest in representing multiple defendants is so grave that 
ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for more than one of 
several co-defendants except in unusual situations when, after 
careful investigation, it is clear that no conflict is likely i 
to develop and when the several defendants give an informed 
consent to such multiple representation." 
It by no means follows that the inquiry provided for 
by rule 44(c) is unnecessary. For one thing, even the most 
diligent attorney may be unaware of facts giving rise to a * 
potential conflict. Often "counsel must operate somewhat in 
the dark and feel their way uncertainly to an understanding of 
what their clients may be called upon to meet upon a trial" and 
consequently "are frequently unable to foresee developments 
which may require changes in strategy." United States v. 
Carrigan, supra (concurring opinion). "Because the conflicts • 
are often subtle it is not enough to rely upon counsel, who may 
not be totally disinterested, to make sure that each of his 
joint clients has made an effective waiver." United States v. 
Lawriw, supra. 
Moreover, it is important that the trial judge * 
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(Addendum continued) 
(Rule 44(c) continued) 
ascertain whether the effective and fair administration of 
justice would be adversely affected by continued joint repre-
sentation, even when an actual conflict is not then apparent. 
As noted in United States v. Mariy supra (concurring opinion): 
Trial court insistence that, except in 
extraordinary circumstances, codefendants 
retain separate counsel will in the long 
run ... prove salutary not only to the 
administration of justice and the appearance 
of justice but the cost of justice? habeas 
corpus petitions, petitions for new trials, 
appeals and occasionally retrials ... can 
be avoided. Issues as to whether there is 
an actual conflict of interest, whether the 
conflict has resulted in prejudice, whether 
there has been a waiver, whether the waiver 
is intelligent and knowledgeable, for 
example, can all be avoided. Where a 
conflict that first did not appear subsequently 
arises in or before trial, ... continuances 
or mistrials can be saved. Essentially by 
the time a case ... gets to the appellate 
level the harm to the appearance of justice 
has already been done, whether or not 
reversal occurs; at the trial level it is a 
matter which is so easy to avoid. 
A rule 44(c) inquiry is required whether counsel is 
assigned or retained. It "makes no difference whether counsel 
is appointed by the court or selected by the defendants; even 
where selected by the defendants the same dangers of potential 
conflict exist, and it is also possible that the rights of the 
public to the proper administration of justice may be affected 
adversely." United States v. Mari, supra (concurring opinion). 
See also United States v. Lawriw, supra. When there has been 
"no discussion as to possible conflict initiated by the court," 
it cannot be assumed taht the choice of counsel by the defendants 
"was intelligently made with knowledge of any possible conflict." 
United States v. Carrigan, supra. As for assigned counsel, it 
is provided by statute that "the court shall appoint separate 
counsel for defendants having interests that cannot properly be 
represented by the same counsel, or when other good cause is 
shown." 18 U.S.C §3006(A)(b). Rule 44(c) is not intended to 
prohibit the automatic appointment of separate counsel in the 
first instance, see Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967), which would obviate the necessity for an inquiry. 
Under rule 44(c), an inquiry is called for when the 
joined defendants are represented by the same attorney and also 
when they are represented by attorneys "associated in the 
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practice of law". This is consistent with Code of Professional 
Responsibilty, Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) (providing that if "a 
lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from 
employment" because of a potential conflict, "no partner or 
associate of his or his firm may accept or continue such 
employment"); and ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function 
§3.5(b) (Approved Draft, 1971) (applicable to "a lawyer or 
lawyers who are associated in practice"). Attorney representing 
joined defendants should so advise the court if they are 
associated in the practice of law. 
The rule 44(c) procedure is not limited to cases 
expected to go to trial. Although the more dramatic conflict 
situations, such as when the question arises as to whether the 
several defendants should take the stand, Morgan v. United 
States, 396 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968), tend to occur in a trial 
context, serious conflicts may aslo arise when one or more of 
the jointly represented defendants pleads guilty. 
The problem is that even where as here both 
co-defendants pleaded guilty there are 
frequently potential conflicts of interest 
... [T]he prosecutor may be inclined to 
accept a guilty plea from one co-defendant 
which may harm the interests of the other. 
The contrast in the dispositions of the 
cases may have a harmful impact on the co-
defendant who does not initially plead 
guilty; he may be pressured into pleading 
guilty himself rather than face his co-
defendant's bargained-for testimony at a 
trial. And it will be his own counsel's 
recommendation to the initially pleading co-
defendant which will have contributed to 
this harmful impact upon him ... [I]n a 
given instance it would be at least 
conceivable that the prosecutor would be 
willing to accept pleas to lesser offenses 
from two defendants in preference to a plea 
of guilty by one defendant to a greater 
offense. 
United States v. Mari, supra (concurring opinion). 
To the same effect is ABA Standards Relating to the Defense 
Function at 213-14. 
It is comtemplated that under rule 44(c) the court 
will make appropriate inquiry of the defendants and of counsel 
regarding the possibility of a conflict of interest developing. 
Whenever it is necessary to make a more particularized inquiry 
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into the nature of the contemplated defense, the court should 
"pursue the inquiry with defendants and their counsel on the 
record but in chambers" so as "to avoid the possibility of 
prejudicial disclosures to the prosecution." United States v. 
Foster, supra. It is important that each defendant be "fully 
advised of the facts underlying the potential conflict and is 
given an opportunity to express his or her views." United 
States v. Alberti, supra. The rule specifically requires that 
the court personally advise each defendant of his right to 
effective assistance of counsel, including separate representa-
tion. See United States v* Foster, supra, requiring that the 
court make a determination that jointly represented defendants 
"understand that they may retain separate counsel, or if quali-
fied, may have such counsel appointed by the court and paid for 
by the government." 
Under rule 44(c), the court is to take appropriate 
measures to protect each defendant's right to counsel unless it 
appears "there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest 
is likely to arise" as a consequence of the continuation of 
such joint representation. A less demanding standard wold not 
adequately protect the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel or the effective administration of criminal 
justice. Although joint representation "is not per se violative 
of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel, 
Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, it would not suffice to require 
the court to act only when a conflict of interest if then 
apparent, for it is not possible to "anticipate with complete 
accuracy the course that a criminal trial may take." Fryar v. 
United States, 404 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1968). This is parti-
cularly so in light of the fact that if a conflict later arises 
and a defendant thereafter raises a Sixth Amendment objection, 
a court must grant relief without indulging "in nice calculations 
as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." Glasser 
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). This is because, as the 
Supreme Court more recently noted in Holloway v. Arkansas, 
supra, "in a case of joint representation of conflicting in-
terests the evil ... is in what the advocate finds himself 
compelled to refrain from doing," and this makes it "virtually 
impossible" to assess the impact of the conflict. 
Rule 44(c) does not specify what particular measures 
must be taken. It is appropriate to leave this within the 
court's discretion, for the measures which will best protect 
each defendant's right to counsel may well vary from case to 
case. One possible course of action is for the court to obtain 
a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to 
separate representation, for, as noted in Holloway v. Arkansas, 
supra, "a defendant may waive his right to the assistance of an 
attorney unhindered by a conflict of interests". See United 
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States v. DeBerry, supra, holding that defendants should be 
jointly represented only if "the court has ascertained that ... 
each understands clearly the possibilities of a conflict of 
interest and waives any rights in connection with it." It must 
be emphasized that a "waiver of the right to separate represen-
tation should not be accepted by the court unless the defendants 
have each been informed of the probable hazards; and the voluntary 
character of their waiver is apparent." ABA Standards Relating 
to the Function of the Trial Judge at 45. United States v. 
Garcia, supra, spells out in significant detail what should be 
done to assure an adequate waiver: 
As in Rule 11 procedures, the district 
court should address each defendant personally 
and forthrightly advise him of the potential 
dangers of representation by counsel with a 
conflict of interest. The defendant must 
be at liberty to question the district 
court as to the nature and consequences of 
his legal representation. Most significantly, 
the court should seek to elicit a narrative 
response from each defendant that he has 
been advised of his right to effective 
representation, that he understands the 
details of his attorney's possible conflict 
of interest and the potential perils of 
such a conflict, that he has discussed the 
matter with his attorney or if he wishes 
with outside counsel, and that he voluntarily 
waives his Sixth Amendment protections. It 
is, of course, vital that the waiver be 
established by "clear, unequivocal, and 
unambiguous language." .. Mere assent in 
response to a series of questions from the 
bench may in some circumstances constitute 
an adequate waiver, but the court should 
nonetheless endeavor to have each defendant 
personally articulate in detail his intent 
to forego this significant constitutional 
protection. Recordation of the waiver 
colloque between defendant and judge, will 
also serve the government's interest by 
assisting in shielding any potential 
conviction from collateral attack, either 
on Sixth Amendment grounds or on a Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendment "fundamental fairness 
basis. 
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See also Hyman, Joint Representation of Multiple 
Defendants in a Criminal Trial: The Court1s Headache, 5 Hofstra 
L.Rev.315, 334 (1977). 
Another possibility is that the court will order that 
the defendants be separately represented in subsequent proceedings 
in the case. 
Though the court must remain alert to and 
take account of the fact that "certain 
advantages might accrue from joint 
representation," Holloway v. Arkansas, 
supra, it need not permit the joint 
representation to continue merely because 
the defendants express a willingness to so 
proceed. That is, there will be cases 
where the court should require separate 
counsel to represent certain defendants 
despite the expressed wishes of such 
defendants. Indeed, failure of the trial 
court to require separate representation 
may ... require a new trial, even though 
the defendants have expressed a desire to 
continue with the same counsel. The right 
to effective representation by counsel 
whose loyalty is undivided is so paramount 
in the proper administration of criminal 
justice that it must in some cases take 
precedence over all other considerations, 
including the expressed preference of the 
defendants concerned and their attorney. 
United States v. Carrigan, supra (concurring opinion). 
See also United States v. Lawriw, supra; Abraham v. United 
States, supra; ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function 
at 213, concluding that in some circumstances "even full 
disclosure and consent of the client may not be an adequate 
protection." As noted in United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 
(3d Cir. 1978), such an order may be necessary where the trial 
judge is 
not satisfied that the waiver is proper. 
For example, a defendant may be competent 
enough to stand trial, but not competent 
enough to understand the complex, subtle, 
and sometimes unforeseeable dangers inherent 
in multiple representation. More importantly, 
the judge may find that the waiver cannot 
be intelligently made simply because he is 
not in a position to inform the defendant 
of the forseeable prejudices multiple 
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As concluded in DoLan, "exercise of the court's 
supervisory powers by disqualifying an attorney representing 
multiple criminal defendants in spite of the defendants' express 
desire to retain that attorney does not necessarily abrogate 
defendant's sixth amendment rights". It does not follow from 
the absolute right of self-representation recognized in Faretta 
v, California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), that there is an absolute 
right to counsel of one's own choice. Thusf 
when a trial court finds an actual conflict 
of interest which impairs the ability of a 
criminal defendant's chosen counsel to 
conform with the ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility, the court should not be 
required to tolerate an inadequate 
representation of a defendant. Such 
representation not only constitutes a breach 
of professional ethics and invites disrespect 
for the integrity of the court, but it is 
also detrimental to the independent interest 
of the trial judge to be free from future 
attacks over the adequacy of the waiver or 
the fairness of the proceedings in his own 
court and the subtle problems implicating 
the defendant's comprehension of the waiver. 
Under such circumstances, the court can 
elect to exercise its supervisory authority 
over members of the bar to enforce the 
ethical standard requiring an attorney to 
decline multiple representation. 
United States v. Dolan, supra. See also Geer, Conflict 
of Interest and Multiple Defendants in a Criminal Case: 
Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 
Minn.L.Rev. 119 (1978); Note, Conflict of Interests in Multiple 
Representation of Criminal Co-Defendants, 68 J.Crim.L. & C. 226 
(1977) . 
The failure in a particular case to conduct a rule 
44(c) inquiry would not, standing alone, necessitate the reversal 
of a conviction of a jointly represented defendant. However, 
as is currently the case, a reviewing court is more likely to 
assume a conflict resulted from the joint representation when 
no inquiry or an inadequate inquiry was conducted. United 
States v. Carrigan, supra; United States v. DeBerry, supra. On 
the other hand, the mere fact that a rule 44(c) inquiry was 
conducted in the early stages of the case does not relieve the 
court of all responsibility in this regard thereafter. The 
obligation placed upon the court by rule 44(c) is a continuing 
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onef and thus in a particular case further inquiry may be 
necessary on a later occasion because of new developments 
suggesting a potential conflict of interest* 
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